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Original Intent and Boris Bittker
RAouL BERGER*
INTRODUCTION
A late entrant in the original intent debate, Professor Bons Bittker brings
formidable skills and a disarmingly urbane style and wit to bear on the
issue.' His probing analysis and hitherto unasked questions wrung from my
lips, "Oh, to be 75 again." Since his article is studded with citations to my
works, I feel constrained to gird up my aged loins and break a lance with
him. In great part he casts his argument in the form of imaginary dialogues
and fictional judicial decisions. On the analogy of ancient priests who spoke
from a cave through the lips of oracles, I shall assume that it is Bittker,
not his puppets, who speaks.
By way of illustrating the absurdity of resort to the original intent, Bittker
summons the Antitrust Act. Generally the Act is considered to rest on the
commerce clause power, but he recalls that "a primary task of the Phila-
delpia Convention of 1787 was to eliminate obstructions to interstate
commerce that states imposed upon each other," and that the original intent
was to limit the interstate power to the "mischief it was meant to remedy." '2
Tis is a paraphrase of some of my remarks in a chapter which emphasized
that the interstate power was not designed to encroach on a state's purely
internal affairs. 3 Bittker reasons that to apply the mischief-remedy principle
"mght metastasize from the state's highways to the heavens above . . and
* LL.D., 1988, Northwestern University School of Law; LL.D., 1978, University of
Michigan Law School; LL.M., 1938, Harvard University Law School; J.D., 1935, Northwestern
University School of Law.
I. Bittker, The Bicentennial of the Jurisprudence of Original Intent: The Recent Past, 77
CAiF. L. Ray. 235 (1989).
2. Id. at 240. Bittker notes that "Senator Sherman expressed doubts about the constitu-
tionality" of the Act, saying, "It is very clear there is no such power unless it is derived from
the power of levying taxes; that it is a power which must be exercised by each State for
itself." Id. at 241 n.25. "[Als recently as 1874 the Supreme Court recognized that the
federal power to reach into the states to regulate railroads was problematic." Id. at 248. And,
Bittker calls attention to "Congress' reliance on its power to establish military and postal
roads as a basis for regulating railroads (thus sidestepping doubts about its authority under
the commerce clause)." Id. at 248 n.49.
He cites me for "concern about free passage of goods, not of people, prompted the
commerce clause." Id. at 249 n.51. I wrote, "As Zechariah Chafee noted, 'Though much was
said about barriers at State lines against goods, nobody spoke about persons,' presumably
because the Framers assumed such barriers had been razed by Article IV " R. BERGER,
FEEaALisM: ThE FouNhlEas' DESIGN 125-26 (1987) [hereinafter R. BERGER, FEDERALISM].
3. R. BERGER, FEDERALISM, supra note 2, at 120-57.
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balkanize the nation's already dangerous skies. ' 4 There is no need to read
the legislative history so narrowly, particularly in light of related comments.
The line between federal and state junsprudence was cogently drawn by
James Wilson:
Whatever object of government is confined in its operation and effect,
within the bounds of a particular state, should be considered as belonging
to the government of that state; whatever object of government extends,
in its operation or effects, beyond the bounds of a particular state,
should be considered as belonging to the government of the United
States.5
'Wherever an object occurs,"' he said, "'to the direction of which no
state is competent, the management of it must, of necessity, belong to the
United States."' 6 Here is the rationale of the federal power to make war,
negotiate treaties or regulate foreign commerce. 7 Thirteen states could not
separately make war, negotiate treaties or regulate foreign commerce. Nor
can fifty states regulate a flight from Boston to Los Angeles.
8
True, this particular instance did not occur to the framers. But they
foresaw that the nation would expand westward. Air transportation across
the continent falls within the rationale of federal junsdiction: only the
federal government can regulate it. Assuming that the foregoing analysis is
questionable, the situation is not irreparable. In a similar context, Madison
stated, "[hiad the power of making treaties . . been omitted, however
necessary it might have been, the defect could only have been lamented, or
supplied by an amendment of the Constitution." 9
Activists ring the changes on the consequences of renouncing the benefits
of even more recent legislation,' 0 but they never weigh them against the
consequences of ratifying the role of the Court as a "continuing constitu-
tional convention,"" constantly engaged in revising the Constitution, a role
4. Bittker, supra note 1, at 249.
5. R. BERGER, FEDERALISM, supra note 2, at 71.
6. Id.
7. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 303 (J. Madison) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1941). He was anticipated
by Roger Sherman in the Federal Convention. 1 M. FABRAND, RECORDS OF TE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 133 (1911).
8. Bittker, supra note 1, at 249. I express no opimon as to the constitutionality of the
Antitrust Act.
9. 2 ANNALS OF CONO. 1900-01 (1791).
10. Balkin, Constitutional Interpretation and the Problem of History (Book Review), 63
N.Y.U. L. REv 911, 925 (1988).
11. Leonard Levy considers that the Court "has no alternative" to behaving like a
"continuous constitutional convention." L. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CON-
STITUTON 351 (1988). Edward Corwm observed that Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2
(1866), "virtually ratifies Jeremiah Black's argument for Milligan, that 'a violation of law on
the pretence of saving such a government as ours is not self-preservation, but suicide."' E.
CoRwiN, TwnioiT OF ma SUPREME COURT 134 (1934) (quoting Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4
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that is without the slightest warrant in the text and history of the Consti-
tution. To make the Court the ultimate arbiter of national policy seems to
me a far graver consequence than to overturn "desirable" unauthorized
legislation.' 2 Further, rejection of original intent saps the very foundation
of judicial review itself. Nowhere does the Constitution explicitly authorize
the courts to overturn federal or state legislation. Is it preferable to regard
judicial review as a naked arrogation rather than resort to the original intent
that shows it was contemplated by the framers and ratifiers? 3 Unlike his
activist colleagues, Bittker, as will appear, faces up to such issues.
Before grappling with Bittker's microscopic division of analysis-he pro-
ceeds on the adage "divide and conquer"-let me set out a couple of
concrete examples of clear, unassailable original intent, following the com-
mon law tradition of proceeding from the particular rather than from some
overarching generalization.1
4
There was remarkable unammity m the Federal Convention, The Federalist
and the ratification conventions that the Senate was to participate in making
treaties, not merely to rubber-stamp them after they had been made by the
President. As late as August 6, the Convention's Counittee on Detail draft
provided that "the Senate . . shall have power to make treaties."" During
the debate Madison observed that the Senate "represented the States alone,"
and consequently, "the President should. be an agent in Treaties.' 1 6 As the
Wall.) at 81.
I would not burden Bittker with the sins of his activist colleagues. A refreshing aspect of
his study is his readiness to set forth the opposing position. For instance, he notes .'[t]he
acknowledged power of a State to regulate its police,"' i.e., its "internal policy." Bittker,
supra note 1, at 245 & n.32 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 208 (1824)).
And he notices that federal supremacy is limited by the terms of the supremacy clause to
action under "delegated or enumerated powers." Bittker, supra note 1, at 246 (emphasis in
original). He contributes to my education by adverting to the "widespread agreement that
each state had exclusive authority over the roads within its boundaries[,]" id. at 247 n.43
(citing Railroad Co. v. Maryland, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 456, 470 (1874)), and observing that
"the commerce clause excludes control over turnpikes[.]" Id. (citing Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S.
(14 How.) 568, 574 (1852)).
12. See Washington's Farewell Address, quoted infra text accompanying note 229.
Another horrendous "consequences" example is furnished by the extension of due process
to corporations, notwithstanding it was "originally intended by the framers" to "limit the
fifth amendment's guarantee of due process to natural persons." Bittker, supra note I, at
251; see also id. at 253-54. Attempting to read corporations out of the fourteenth amendment,
Justice Black declared that "the people were not told that [they were ratifying] an
amendment granting new and revolutionary rights to corporations." Connecticut Gen. Life
Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 86 (1938) (dissenting). See also the remarks of Justice Curtis
in 1872, quoted in Bittker, supra note 1, at 254. Bittker notes Willard Hurst's "conclusion
that the courts brought corporations into the protected class by 'fresh lawmaking."' Id. at
255 n.66.
13. See R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. TnE SUPREmE COURT 49-143 (1969).
14. "The enumeration of first principles has always been obnoxious to the English mind."
W. Csuacma, HISTORY OF THE ENG ISH SPEAKING PEoPLEs 295 (Commager ed. 1965).
15. 2 M. FAR.RAND, supra note 7, at 183.
16. Id. at 392.
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Convention drew to a close, the Committee of Eleven proposed on Septem-
ber 4 that the "President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
shall have power to make treaties[.] 11 7 Rufus King observed that "as the
Executive was here joined in the business, there was a check [on the Senate]
which did not exist in [the prior] Congress."',, In The Federalist Number
38 Madison wrote that the Constitution "empowers the Senate, with the
concurrence of the Executive, to make treaties[.]' 9
Clear-cut confirmation is furmshed by Hamilton in The Federalist Number
75:
[Tihe vast importance of the trust, and the operation of treaties as laws,
plead strongly for the participation of the legislative body in the
office of making them.
It must indeed be clear to a demonstration that the joint possession
of the power in question, by the President and Senate, would afford a
greater prospect of security, than the separate possession of it by either
of them.20
Such expression likewise was voiced in several ratification conventions.
Hamilton explained in New York that "[tihey, together with the President,
are to manage all our concerns with foreign nations." And Chancellor
Livingston said that the members of the Senate "are to form treaties with
foreign nations." 2' In Pennsylvania, James Wilson stated, "nor is there any
doubt but the Senate and President possess the power of making (treaties)."2
In North Carolina, Samuel Spencer said that the members of the Senate
"are, in effect, to form treaties.'"n Surely this history illustrates the "ho-
mogenous intent" Bittker suggested it was impossible to distill.24 To ignore
this history is to insulate presidential claims to a monopoly on foreign
relations, a "consequence," I hazard, that Bittker would find unpalatable.
Consider an even plainer example of original intent, the exclusion of
suffrage from the reach of the fourteenth amendment, which in recent years
has become a lesser Constitution. Senator Jacob Howard, to whom it fell
to explain the amendment, said:
We know very well that the States retain the power, which they have
always possessed, of regulating the right of suffrage in the States. It is
the theory of the Constitution itself. That right has never been taken
from them and the theory of this whole Amendment is, to leave
17 Id. at 495.
18. Id. at 540.
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 38, supra note 7, at 240.
20. THE FEDERALIST No. 75, supra note 4, at 486, 488.
21. 2 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE CONSTITUTION 291, 306 (2d ed. 1836).
22. Id. at 506.
23. 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 21, at 116.
24. See Bittker, supra note 1, at 267.
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the power of regulating the suffrage with the people or Legislatures of
the States, and not to assume to regulate it by any clause of the
Constitution.Y
Howard is confirmed by the Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruc-
tion (of both Houses) which drafted the amendment: "It was doubtful...
whether the States would consent to surrender a power they had always
exercised, and to which they were attached." Consequently, it commended
section two because it "would leave the whole question with the people of
each State." 26 Justly did Justice Harlan consider this as irrefutable and
unanswered evidence of the framers' exclusion of suffrage from the four-
teenth amendment. 27 Nevertheless, the Court decided that the Constitution
required reapportionment 28 in the face of the incontrovertible evidence that
suffrage was excluded from the federal jurisdiction. One may applaud the
"result" 29 and yet deplore the judicial assumption of power to revise the
Constitution.
I. ORGINAL INTENT
It is not enough to advert to the originalists' "central tenet [that]
'[t]he intention of the lawmaker is the law, rising above even the text."' 30
For that tenet is not only rooted in six hundred years of Anglo-American
law; but as the Supreme Court noted, it was also invoked in medieval days
for a surgeon's bloodletting in the streets 'of Bologna.3' Chief Justice
Marshall stated that it was the "most sacred rule of interpretation.1 32 The
doctrine, wrote Thomas Grey, himself an activist, is "deeply rooted in our
history and in our shared principles of political legitimacy. It has equally
deep roots in our formal Constitutional law. ' 33 Because Bittker calls atten-
tion to Jefferson Powell's "recent analysis of the interpretative principles
25. A. Avis, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES 237 (1967).
26. Id. at 94.
27. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 200-02 (1970) (dissenting in part).
28. Baker V. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
29. But see W ELLIOTT, THE RISE OF A GuARiAN DEMOCRACY (1974). Writing of the one
man-one vote decision, Vannevar Bush, a brilliant scientist and engineer, said of those who
support the decision
on the basis of necessity, since the regular legislative process would not correct
an obviously unfair situation[,] . . this is [like] saying in effect that the
democratic system will not work, and that it must be supplemented by absolute
power in the hands of a group of men independent of the public will. This is a
hazardous concept [.J
V. BUSH, Pmca Oi THE ACTION 17-18 (1970).
30. Bittker, supra note 1, at 242 (quoting R. BERGER, FEDERALISM, supra note 2, at 15-
16).
31. Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 212 (1903).
32. JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF McCulloch v. Maryland 167 (G. Gunther ed. 1969).
33. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 705 (1975).
1991]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
accepted by the framers at the time of the Philadelphia Convention,"' '
wherein Powell, the venest tyro,35 read original intent out of the common
law, I may be indulged for a very brief summary of some proof to the
contrary
Powell acknowledged that the "central concept-the goal-of common
law interpretation was indeed what the common lawyers called 'intention,"
'11 6
but he proffers a "curious" theory 7 that basically "intention" was "a
product of the interpretive process rather than somethng locked into the
text by [the] author."38 Thus despite their constant differentiation between
"words" and "intent," between the "maker's intent" and his "words,"
the common lawyer, according to Powell, excluded the actual intent and
looked for it only in the words, when it would have been far simpler merely
to inquire what the words "meant." For such "meamng," Justice Holmes
said, "we ask, not what this man meant, but what those words would mean
in the mouth of the normal speaker." 3 9
The common law resort to actual intent clearly speaks against Powell. A
few highlights will suffice.
(1) Chief Justice Frowycke, a fifteenth century sage, recounted that in
1285 the judges asked the "statute makers whether the warrantie with assettz
shulde be a barre" in the Statute of Westminster and "they answered that
it shulde. '"40
(2) "And so," Frowycke continued, "in our dayes, have those that were
the penners & devisors of statutes bene the grettest lighte for exposicion of
statutes."
41
(3) In the Magdalen College Case Chief Justice Coke stated that "in Acts
of Parliament which are to be construed according to the intent and meaning
34. Bittker, supra note 1, at 264 (emphasis added); see Powell, The Modem Misunder-
standing of Original Intent, 54 U. Cm. L. Rv. 1513, 1534 (1987) [hereinafter Powell,
Misunderstanding]; Berger, "Original Intention" in Historical Perspective, 54 GEo. WASH. L.
Rxv 296, 334 (1986); Berger, The Founders' Views-According to Jefferson Powell, 67 Tax.
L. REy 1033 (1989) [hereinafter Berger, Founders' Views].
35. Powell was but three years out of law school when he published The Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv L. Rxv 885 (1985) [hereinafter Powell, Original
Understanding]. He labelled my Federalism: The Founders' Design as an "attempt to write
lustory," exhibiting "insensitivity to the evidence," Powell, Misunderstanding, supra note 34,
at 1515 n.10, "seriously misleading," id. at 1521, a "distorted portrait of the founders'
views," id. at 1544, and the like, see id. at 1519, 1524. It is therefore not a little remarkable
that Bittker should give credence to Powell after saying, "For the leading scholarly
support for a revival of dual federalism, see R. BEROER, FEDERALISM[.]" Bittker, supra note
1, at 244 n.30.
36. Powell, Misunderstanding, supra note 34, at 1533.
37. Id. at 1534.
38. Powell, Original Understanding, supra note 35, at 899.
39. O.W HoLMEs, CoLLEcTED LEa PAms 204 (1920).
40. A DiscouxsE UPON Tim EXPOSICION & UNDERSTANDINGE OF STATUTES 151 (S. Thorne
ed. 1942) [hereinafter A DiscouRsa].
41. Id. at 151-52.
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of the makers of them, the original intent and meamng is to be observed
1142
(4) Lord Chancellor Hatton, writing circa 1587-1591, said "when the
intent is proved that must be followed ... but whensoever there is departure
from the words to the intent, that must be well proved that there is such
meaning. ' 43 Necessarily proof had to be drawn from evidence of the maker's
extrinsic intent.
(5) A leading legal histonan, Samuel Thorne, concluded that "actual
intent ... is controlling from Hengham's day to that of Lord Nottingham
(1678).""
The common law understanding of interpretation and intent was epitom-
ized by John Selden's remark: "[A] mans wryting has but one true sense;
which is that which the Author meant when he writ [sic] it.""41 That is the
essence of communication; a speaker must be permitted to explain what he
means. The reader may not saddle the writer with the reader's meamng.
To hold the contrary is to maintain, as Judge Frank Easterbrook remarked,
"it is the readers rather than the writers who matter." 46 All of Powell's
indefatigable dredging could not raise one common law "precedent" that
can withstand scrutiny. 47
The deep-rooted doctrine of contemporaneous construction reinforces
reference to actual intent. As long ago as the fifteenth century, Chief Justice
Frowycke stated that if the legislators "have not gyven anie declaracion of
theire myndes," then those "muste persuade us that were mooste neerest
the statute.""4 Justice William Johnson explained that contemporaries of
42. 11 Co. Rep. 66b, 73b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1235, 1245 (K.B. 1586).
43. C. HATrON, A TAnTIs E CONCERNING STATUTES OR ACTS OF PARLAmErs: AND THE
ExposrrioN THmREoF 14-15 (1677) (mcrofilm edition created in 1972 by Umversity Microfilms
of Ann Arbor, Michigan).
44. A DISCOURSE, supra note 40, at 60 n.126.
45. J. SEOEN, TABLE TALK OF Jom SELDEN 12-13 (F Pollack ed. 1927). In Leviathan
Hobbes wrote, "'not the Letter but that which is according to the intention of the
Legislator, is the Law."' Quoted in G. McDowEIL, EQurry AND THE CoNsTrUoN 28 (1982).
James Wilson wrote that the law is to be explained "according to the intention of those who
made it." 2 J. WIsoN, WORKS 479 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).
46. Easterbrook, The Influence of Judicial Review on Constitutional Theory, m A WORK-
ABLE GOvRmaENT? THE CONsTITUTION AFrER 200 YERks 173 (B. Marshall ed. 1987).
47. Powell relies on (1) a 1790 treatise on contract holding that one party to a contract
may not plead that he understood a term m a special undisclosed sense, to the detriment of
the other party. Understandably the treatise stated that the law "is not concerned with any
one's 'internal sentiments' but only with their 'external expression."' Powell, Original
Understanding, supra note 35, at 895-96; Berger, Founders' Views, supra note 34, at 1060. (2)
Selden said that "the Judge speaks of the King's Proclamation, this is the Intention of the
King, not that the King had declared is Intention any other way to the Judge." J. SEDRN,
supra note 45, at 44. Powell interprets this as determimng 'the intention of the King' solely
on the basis of the words." Powell, Original Understanding, supra note 35, at 895. There was
no alternative given that the King had given no declaration of his intention. For more complete
discussion of these "precedents," see Berger, Founders' Views, supra note 34, at 1059-60.
48. A DISCOURSE, supra note 40, at 151-52.
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the Constitution "had the best opportunities of informing themselves of the
understanding of the framers .. and of the sense put upon it by the
people when it was adopted by them." 49 It is unreasonable to defer to "the
understanding of the framers," received second hand, while rejecting their
own explanation of their intent.
The same result is dictated by the related rule, going back to Heydon 's
Case (1584): the judge must seek "the mischief the framers were seeking to
alleviate."5 0 That mischief was collected from extrinsic circumstances. Why
is such collection entitled to more respect than the framers' own clear
explanation of what they sought to accomplish? A cognate, long-established
rule is that when the drafters employed common law terms (e.g., habeas
corpus), the common law "definitions," as Justice Story stated, "are
necessarily included, as much as if they stood in the text." 5' Resort to the
common law elucidation of the framers' words should rise no higher than
their own explanations of what their words mean.
Thus far I have shown that the common law rule of interpretation
"accepted" by the framers was resort to the drafters' explanations of what
their words meant. Now I shall show by Powell's own words that judicial
interpretation confined to the text was antipathetic to the founders. He
notes-that English Puritans attacked "the elaborate interpretative techniques
of the common law [that] served only to justify judges' imposition of their
personal views," reasomng that "the judiciary could undermine the legis-
lative prerogatives of the people's representatives by engaging in the cor-
ruptive process of interpreting legislative texts," and fearing that the written
law could "be twisted by means of judicial construction. "5 2 He also notes
that "a cultural suspicion of 'interpretation' [was] widespread in eighteenth
century America," and that the Puritan fear of "twisted construction" had
travelled to America.53 This was allied to a "profound fear" of judicial
construction,14 so that Hamilton was constrained to reassure the ratifiers in
The Federalist Number 78 that of the three branches the judiciary is "next
to nothing.""5 The framers, therefore, would have welcomed an approach
that would confime judicial discretion by resort to the clearly discernible
intent of the drafters, the rule prevailing in England. This, not Powell's
"curious" theory, is what the framers "accepted," and what the people
desired. Powell recognizes that the Republican victors viewed the "revolution
49. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 290 (1827).
50. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CA.Is. L. Ray. 929,
943 (1965); Heydon's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 7b, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (Q.B. 1584).
51. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160 (1820).
52. Powell, Original Understanding, supra note 35, at 891-92.
53. Id.
54. G. WooD, Tm CREATION oF Tm AMmmcAN REPuauc 1776-1787, at 298 (1969).
55. THm FEDERAIiST No. 78, supra note 7, at 504.
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of 1800" as the people's endorsement of their "search for the Constitution's
underlying and original 'intent.' '56
With this background in mind, let us examine Bittker's argument. He
notes that "[tlax lawyers routinely invoke 'legislative intent,"' but limit
themselves to "the legislative committee reports." Though these reports are
"written by a legislative bureaucracy" and may "embody only a fictional
intent, it is a fiction that Congress intends the courts to act on."257 The
1866 Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction of both houses was
drafted before the days of legislative bureaucracy and stands on higher
ground. Then too, the Court has taken a broader view than the tax lawyers,
looking to statements by "members of the Committee on the floor of the
Senate and the House,' and to expositions on the floor of Congress "by
those in charge of or sponsoring the legislation." 58 The earlier mentioned
1866 Howard statement on suffrage was made by a member of the Recon-
struction Committee.59 Statements by Madison, who was the chief architect
of the Constitution, and its advocate in The Federalist and the Virginia
Ratification Convention, should stand on the same footing as the sponsors
of modem tax legislation. Bittker, however, considers that "the situation is
totally different" with respect to the framers' intent. "No single source
dominates"; judges must look to the debates in the Convention, The
Federalist, and the ratifying conventions. 60 But suppose that the records of
all three are in accord, as we have seen with respect to foreign relations,
or two out of three, what then?
Edward Corwin found that records regarding judicial review are no less
convincing than the records on foreign relations:
That the members of the Convention of 1787 thought the Constitution
secured to courts in the United States the right to pass on the validity
of acts of Congress under it cannot be reasonably doubted. Confimng
ourselves simply to the available evidence that is strictly contemporaneous
with the framing and ratifying of the Constitution we find the
following members of the Convention that framed the Constitution
definitely asserting that this would be the case: Gerry and King of
Massachusetts, Wilson and Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, Martin
of Maryland, Randolph, Madison, and Mason of Virginia, Dickinson
of Delaware, Yates and Hamilton of New York, Rutledge and Charles
Pinckney of South Carolina, Davie and Williamson of North Carolina,
Sherman and Ellsworth of Connecticut. True these are only seventeen
names out of a possible fifty-five, but let it be considered whose names
56. PoweU, Original Understanding, supra note 35, at 934, 927.
57. Bittker, supra note 1, at 249-50.
58. United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 125 (1942); Wright v. Vinton
Branch, 300 U.S. 440, 463 (1936).
59. See supra text accompanying note 25.
60. Bittker, supra note I, at 250.
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they are. They designate fully three-fourths of the leaders of the Con-
vention[.]6
Of course, in many cases the records do not speak so clearly, but that does
not justify disregarding evidence that does. 62
A "rapidly growing wing of the Junsprudence of Onginal Intent school
of thought," Bittker observes, "has looked to the Declaration of Inde-
pendence." For instance, Henry Jaffa insists that "the principles of the
Constitution are to be found in the Declaration of Independence." 63 To
import the Declaration into the Constitution is to ignore their totally
different provenance. The Declaration was a product of rebels and revolu-
tionaries; when the Constitution was adopted twelve years later, it was no
small- part of a recoil from the "excesses" of popularly elected legislatures.
Men of substance felt threatened and, in the words of John Dickinson,
sought to protect "'the worthy against the licentious." '64 By the time the
Convention was convened, wrote Samuel Eliot Monson and Henry Steele
Commager, "the democratic movement was in abeyance, and a 'thermidor-
ian reaction' in full swing. .. Hence the Federal Constitution put a stopper
on those levelling and confiscatory demands of democracy[.] ''6s Appeals to
the Declaration of Independence are not so much attributable to onginalists
as to activists on the search for wider charters of judicial revisory power,
very much like their appeals to the ninth amendment. 66
At the conclusion of this miscellany, Bittker propounds two questions:
(1) "what types of evidence can properly support judicial conclusions about
the original intent of the framers," and (2) "what pnnciples should deter-
mine whether earlier decisions, if now found inconsistent with the intent of
the framers, should be reversed, qualified, or preserved." 67 Of these in turn.
II. EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING ORIGINAL INTENT
Preliminarily Bittker opines that the records "almost never establish
whether the speaker's views were accepted or endorsed by his colleagues or
whether persons voting for him had their own or independent (and possibly
61. E. CORwIN, THE DOCTRINE OF JuDIciAL REvniw 10-11 (1914) (footnote omitted).
62. For other examples that speak clearly, see supra text accompanying notes 25-27, and
infra text accompanying notes 195-98, 204, 208-12, 213-16, 217-26.
63. Bittker, supra note 1, at 256.
64. Quoted in G. WOOD, supra note 54, at 475.
65. 1 S. MOiusON & H. COMMAOER, THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPURLiC 300 (1942).
During the Reconstruction period, Senator Charles Sumner insisted that "the Constitution
must be interpreted by the Declaration," but found no favor with the Senate. R. BERGER,
SELECTED WRIrINGs ON TaE CONsTITUTION 160 (1987).
66. "Charles Black, for example, has led the way in reading the ninth amendment as a
possible charter for the positive entitlements of the welfare state." Levinson, Constitutional
Rhetoric and the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv 131, 160 (1988).
67. Bittker, supra note 1, at 258.
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inconsistent) reasons for reaching the same result." Bittker's question
invites speculation about the motivation of those who did not speak. Those
who spoke were the leaders, as Corwm noted, 69 and their speech is not to
be dismissed because their followers -chose not to raise their voices.
A. The Philadelphia Convention's Official Records
Bittker asks, "does the fact that two delegates to the Convention (and
perhaps their colleagues) contemplated destruction of the Convention's
official records conflict with the courts' use of these records as evidence of
the meamng of the Constitution? "70 He notes that Wilson, second only to
Madison as architect of the Constitution, urged that they be deposited "'in
the custody of the President"' of the Convention, on the ground that "'as
false suggestions maybe propagated it should not be made impossible to
contradict them.'' (Note Wilson's desire that the records serve as evidence
of the Constitution's meaning.) "With only one dissent, the delegates then
adopted a motion to deposit the journals and other papers of the Convention
with its president, George Washington." 72 That was done, thereby washing
out the views of the "two delegates."
The Journal was deposited with Washington "subject to the order of
Congress, if ever formed," leading Bittker to ask whether the framers would
have "vested Congress with discretion to unveil the documents" had they
intended to sanction their use as evidence of intent.7 3 Wilson, as we have
seen, looked to the Journal to illuminate the meaning of the Constitution,
and no one spoke to the contrary. Then too, the congressional permission
in 1818 to publish74 suggests that contemporaries regarded delayed publi-
cation merely as a matter of convenience, rather than a rejection of Wilson's
view. Bittker also suggests that release at congressional discretion "would
constitute a de facto method of amending the Constitution. ' 7 It is refreshing
to find an activist sympathizer advocate compliance "with the formal
amendment procedure prescribed by article V."'76 It is precisely that failure
to follow article V procedure that is at the heart of the originalist opposition
to judicial revision of the Constitution. Does the exercise of "discretion"
under the article III provision for "such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time order and establish" constitute an "amendment of
68. Id.
69. See supra text accompanying note 61.
70. Bittker, supra note 1, at 260.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 261.
74. Id. at 260.




the Constitution?" Clearly "release" at "the order of Congress" no more
amends the document than does the exercise of judicial discretion. The
grant of a discretionary power is a part of the instrument; exercise of the
power does not "amend" it.
Noting the view that 'if [the record of the Convention] had come to
light at the time of the ratification debates, the Constitution would never
have passed[,]'7 Bittker asks whether courts may "rely on documents that
were deliberately withheld from the ratifiers lest [in Rufus King's words] 'a
bad use would be made of them by those who would wish to prevent the
adoption of the Constitution."' 7 If non-disclosure contannates the "doc-
uments," why does it not equally undermine the adoption? "Can we
presume," Bittker asks, "that framers dishonorably intended to sanction
the use of the suppressed documents once the perceived threat to ratification
was foiled?" 7 9 In the Convention, the Federalists had voted down proposals
to forbid federal interference with internal state matters, "underestimat[ing]
the attachment of citizens to their states[.J" 0 When they emerged from the
Convention and (I wrote) 'were exposed to the sharp winds of public
opimon, they reversed course."'' In an ideal world they would have
confessed that they had urged the opposite view in the Convention, but
that would have exposed them to charges of inconsistency, an embarrassment
that public figures usually avoid, especially in a heated campaign. According
to then Professor Felix Frankfurter, the Court's continuing revision of the
Constitution has never been disclosed to the people.8 2 Does that itself
invalidate its decisions? One need not approve of such non-disclosure and
yet be loathe to label it "dishonorable."
Bittker also invokes my statement respecting "the failure to disclose a
Convention decision to the people," that "there can be no ratification
without disclosure," joimng it to my citation to Justice Story's statement
77. Id. (quoting G. Wius, CINCINNATUS: GEORGo WASHINGTON AND Tm ENLIGuTENmENT
157 (1984)).
78. Id. (quoting 2 M. FAR.irD, supra note 7, at 648). Despite Is criticism of reliance on
one man's statement without showing that his view was shared by his colleagues, Bittker
invokes King without making such a showing.
79. Bittker, supra note 1, at 261.
80. R. Ru r , D, THE ORDEAL OF THE CONsTITUIoN: THE ANTF EDERAUSTS AND
RATmCATION STRUGGLE op 1787-1788, at 31 (1983).
81. Bittker, supra note 1, at 262 n.91 (quoting R. BERGER, FEDERALISM, supra note 2, at
68).
82. As he stated:
People have been taught to believe that when the Supreme Court speaks it is not
they who speak but the Constitution, whereas, of course, in so many vital cases,
it is they who speak and not the Constitution. And I verily believe that that is
what the country needs most to understand.
Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Franklin Roosevelt (Feb. 18, 1937), reprinted In RoosEvELT




that to repudiate representations made to the people would be "a fraud. '83
Nondisclosure of the Convention records, he argues, is equally a fraud.
That is not the rule in private law. Speaking of "mere silence, or a passive
failure to disclose facts," Prosser and Keeton state that "[i]t has commonly
been stated as a general rule, particularly in the older cases, that the action
will not lie for such tacit non-disclosure."1' Failure to disclose the eight to
three decision to reject national corporations, which I addressed, is not to
be equted with nondisclosure of random individual utterances, to which
Bittker himself attaches no weight. So too, representations made to ratifiers
in order to capture votes indicate active misrepresentation rather than mere
nondisclosure. No element of representations to induce votes is presented
by nondisclosure of the Convention records. Bittker's insistence that fraud
is fraud, "whether accomplished by an affirmative representation or by
deliberate nondisclosure" 8s is not well taken.
B.- Madison's Notes
Madison, Bittker recounts, transcribed no more than ten percent of an
average hour's proceeding, and his notes are therefore "not a verbatim
record of the debates."18 6 Surely a high-minded, richly informed scribe may
be trusted to separate the wheat from the chaff. James Hutson, upon whom
Bittker relies, stated, "In taking notes at the Convention, Madison had the
good sense not to try to do too much."187 Bittker observes that the delegates
regarded Madison "'as a semi-official reporter of their proceedings' 8 8. and
presumably accepted the limitations of an amateur. Let incomplete recording
be assumed, that does not impeach the veracity of what was recorded.
Conflicting views are unsparingly set forth. Leonard Levy, who also is
critical of the Notes, recognizes that "the very real possibility exists that
Madison consistently and accurately caught the gist of the debates." 89 While
speakers, Bittker comments, are apt to be critical of reports of their remarks,
they consider that "reports of their colleagues' speeches were more faithful
to the originals[.]" 9° Then too, in many instances speakers gave Madison
their speeches. 9' My own research confirmed, for example, that on the issue
of judicial participation in the presidential veto, the notes of Madison,
83. Bittker, supra note I, at 262 & n.93.
84. W PROSSER & W KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 737 (5th ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted).
85. Bittker, supra note 1, at 262.
86. Id. at 263.
87. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record,
65 Tax. L. Rav. 1, 31 (1986).
88. Bittker, supra note 1, at 265 (quoting 1 M. FAuRMo, supra note 7, at xvi).
89. L. Lavy, supra note 11, at 288.
90. Bittker, supra note 1, at 263.
91. Hutson, supra note 87, at 31.
1991]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Yates, King and Pierce are in substantial accord. 92 So too, Madison's account
of the Convention's rejection of federal corporations, which he had pro-
posed,93 was corroborated by McHenry's notes,9 and by Abraham Baldwin,
who was present and later reminded Justice Wilson, a participant in the
debate, that the Convention had rejected the power to create corporations;
Wilson agreed. 95 James Hutson, upon whom Bittker relies, stated that if
Madison's "notes . are compared to the fragmentary records of debates
left by other delegates . a rough approximation between the different
accounts is evident-demonstrating that Madison was not inventing dialogue,
but was trying to capture what was said."'
Did the framers intend their debates to be used in interpreting the
Constitution? Bittker answers with Madison's statement that when the
Constitution came from the framers 'it was nothing more than the draft
of a plan, nothing but a dead letter' until it was ratified. 97 Hence, Madison
preferred the voice of the ratifiers to that of the framers. Nevertheless, he
regarded the framers' debates as "presumptive evidence of the general
understanding at the time of the language used," 98 and he quite frequently
cited to the framers. In The Federalist Number 40 he wrote, "It may be
collected from [the Convention's] proceedings, that they were deeply and
unanimously impressed with the crisis . . "99 He wrote in 1826 to Andrew
Stevenson that the true sense of the Constitution only can be found "in
the proceedings of the Convention, the contemporary expositions [The
Federalist], and, above all, in the ratifying conventions of the States."' 1
Writing to Edward Livingston in 1824, he recalled that the authority to
make canals "had been repeatedly proposed in the convention, and nega-
tived."' 1 1 In 1830 he wrote to Andrew Stevenson, "the terms in question
were not suspected in the Convention . of any such meaning," adding
92. 1 M. FARA Nr, supra note 7, at 97-98 (Madison); id. at 105 (Yates); id. at 108 (King);
id. at 109 (Butler); see also 2 M. FARUUND, supra note 7, at 72 (the confirming vote in the
Journal respecting participation in the veto). Compare the general agreement of Yates, King
and Pierce respecting the creation of one Executive and the nature of his veto. I M. FARRAND,
supra note 7, at 105-10.
93. 2 M. FAI wND, supra note 7, at 615-16.
94. Id. at 620.
95. 3 M. FAiiNiD, supra note 7, at 375-76.
96. Hutson, supra note 87, at 33.
97. Bittker, supra note 1, at 264 (quoting 5 ANAi.s oF CoNo. 776 (1796)).
98. Letter from James Madison to M.L. Hurlbert (May, 1830), reprinted in 9 WRrNmGS
OF JAmEs MADISON 372 (G. Hunt ed. 1910). Leonard Levy notes that Madison "had determined
to preserve to the best of his ability 'an exact account of what might pass in the convention,'
because the record would be of value 'for the History of a Constitution."' L. LEVY, supra
note 11, at 2.
99. THE FEDERAL ST No. 40, supra note 7, at 256.
100. 3 LETTERs AND OTHER WrrIIGS OF JAmES MADISON 522 (1865) [hereinafter MADisoN's
LETTERs].
101. Id. at 435.
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that they were viewed in the contrary sense "throughout the recorded
proceedings of the Convention." 102
Other framers cited to the Convention proceedings, among them George
Washington, president of the Convention, cited to its Journal; 13 Abraham
Baldwin, Charles Pinckney and Caleb Strong referred to discussions in the
Convention.104 Frequently the ratifiers called upon the framers in their midst
to explain a provision of the Constitution. 0 5 Thus, in the Virginia Conven-
tion, Monroe called upon Madison "who had been in the federal Convention
... [to] give information respecting the clause concerning elections."' 1° And
Randolph observed that ex post facto laws "relate solely to criminal cases
[for] . . it was so interpreted in the Convention."' 107 Wilson, it will be
recalled, insisted on preservation of the records of the'Convention for future
contradiction of false interpretations.'"
If, Bittker continues, "Madison had thought that his notes could unlock
any of the Constitution's interpretative riddles, would he have treated them
as his private property, secreting them for his lifetime, and thus enabling
hIs widow to release them for this compelling public purpose only when
and if Congress was prepared to pay the p "ce?'' 9 The imputation that
Madison "secreted" the notes in order to exact a "price" is refuted by
Madison's own explanations. He leaned to "letting the publication be a
posthumous one" because, he later explained, "as no personal or party
102. 4 MADISON's LEmTns, supra note 100, at 128, 137. Of Madison, Justice Story wrote:
Venerable, as he now is, from age and character, and absolved from all those
political connections which may influence the judgment and nuslead the nund,
he speaks from lus retirement in a voice which cannot be disregarded, when it
instructs us by its profound reasoning, or admonishes us of our dangers by its
searching appeals.
I J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATEs § 396, at 289 (4th
ed. 1873).
103. Powell, Onginal Understanding, supra note 35, at 920-21.
104. 3 M. FARRuAw, supra note 7, at 369-70, 375-76 (Baldwin); id. at 249-50 (Pinckney);
id. at 247 (Strong). So too, m the Virgima Ratification Convention Madison referred to the
views of the framers, 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 21, at 537, 619, as did Edmund Randolph, id.
at 599, and George Mason, id. at 604.
105. 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 21, at 272-73 (Lansing and Hamilton in New York); 3 J.
ELUaor, supra note 21, at 332-33, 368-69 (Henry in Virginia); 1d. at 291-92 (Grayson in
Virginia); id. at 366 (Monroe m Virginia); id. at 477 (Randolph in Virginia); id. at 522, 604
(Mason in Virginia); 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 21, at 27, 100, 139, 144 (Spaight in North
Carolina); id. at 31, 42-43, 103 (Davie in North Carolina); id. at 255-57, 260, 264-65 (Charles
Pinckney and C.C. Pinckney in South Carolina); 3 M. FARAN D, supra note 7, at 144 (Wilson
in Pennsylvama).
106. 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 21, at 366. Among the delegates to the Ratification Convention,
Bittker notes, were "some of the 55 Philadelphia framers, and their influence may well have
been proportionately greater than their number." Bittker, supra note 1, at 266 n.1l0 (citation
omitted). The fact that the framer-delegates were often asked about the views expressed in the
Convention removes this from conjecture.
107. 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 21, at 477.
108. 2 M. FAURAND, supra note 7, at 648.
109. Bittker, supra note 1, at 264-65.
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views can then be imputed, they will be read with less of personal or party
feelings, and consequently, with whatever profit, may be promised by
them"110-tacit recognition that they might serve as evidence of intent.
Throughout, he avoided making the Notes a shuttlecock of political con-
troversy.
C. The Ratifying Conventions
"[How should we distinguish," asks Bittker, "between corporate inter-
pretations of the Constitution, which commanded the assent of a significant
or controlling fraction of the delegates, and personal opmions, which were
regarded by the rest of the delegates as idiosyncratic utterances?""' That
individual utterances were regarded by the rest as "idiosyncratic" cannot
rest on bare assertion but must be proved. In the course of my own studies,
I can recall but one such instance; referring to Hamilton, Dr. William
Johnson stated in the Convention, "One Gentleman alone (Col. Hamilton)
boldly and decisively contended for an abolition of the State
Gov[emmen]ts." 2 Consider in contrast the remarkable unanimity of indi-
vidual utterances respecting judicial review In the Virginia Convention,
Marshall (it is generally forgotten) asked, "To what quarter will you look
for protection from an infringement on the Constitution, if you win not
give the power to the judiciary9 "" 3 His remarks are in accord with those
of George Nicholas, George Mason, Edmund Randolph, Edmund Pendieton,
James Madison, and even of Patrick Henry and William Grayson, who
opposed the Constitution." 4 Are such "individual" remarks to be excluded
because they did not come to a vote, i.e., a "corporate interpretation?"
Bittker would not "take all opinions supporting the ratification as equally
competent evidence of the intent of the ratifiers," knowing that members
"often vote in favor of measures even if they do not share . . the reasons
stated by their more vocal colleagues[.]""' In effect this would confer a
veto power on the silent. Are we to reject the testimony of Madison, who
was the chief architect of the Constitution, who endeavored in The Federalist
to set forth what the Convention had in mind, because the silent voters
110. 3 M. FAmumo, supra note 7, at 448, 475.
111. Bittker, supra note 1, at 266.
112. 1 M. F~axAMN, supra note 7, at 355.
113. 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 21, at 553-54.
114. R. BERGER, supra note 13, at 15 (Nicholas), id. at 139 (Mason); id. at 138 (Randolph);
id. at 202 (Pendleton); id. at 139 (Madison); id. at 137 (Henry); zd. at 141 (Grayson); see also
supra text accompanying note 61 (Corwin).
115. Bittker, supra note 1, at 267. Bittker cites my reference to "the uncertainty of inferences
drawn from a record of naked votes." Id. at 267 n.112 (emphasis added). Votes accompanied
by statements of Madison et al. are not "naked."
[Vol. 66:723
ORIGINAL INTENT
may not have shared his reasons?1 6 The established practice of giving great
weight in construing statutes to statements by those "sponsoring" legislation
or by members of the committee goes the other way 117 Be it remembered
that the Constitution was under fire in the ratification conventions, and the
explanations to reassure opponents are not to be robbed of effect because
some chose to remain silent.
Bittker invokes an 1845 opimon of the Supreme Court wherein, construing
a statute, the Court said: "The law as it passed is the will of the majority
of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the
act itself; and we must gather their intention from the language there
used."" 8 On the other hand, the Court stated in 1838 that construction
must necessarily depend on the words of the constitution; the meaning
and intention of the convention which framed and proposed it for
adoption and ratification to the conventions., in the several states to
wich this Court has always resorted in constnung the constitution." 9
The conflict between the two cases has long been resolved in favor of the
latter m1' Although Max Radin wrote in 1930 that the 'intention of the
legislature is undiscoverable in any real sense, '""121 Bittker notes that "[tiax
lawyers routinely invoke 'legislative intent."' l"2 The Court declared that
"[w]hen aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute,
is available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use[.] 'J '
Now for some particulars.
Delaware was the first state to ratify the Constitution; but there are no
surviving records of its proceedings; nor is there evidence that such records
were kept. "Is the intent of the Delaware ratifiers less sacrosanct for being
116. This would accord greater weight to silence than to expressions by followers. The
Court stated m United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 125 (1942): "The
opinions of some members of the Senate conflicting with the explicit statements of the meaning
of the statutory language made by members of the Committees are not to be taken
as persuasive of the Congressional purpose."
117. See supra text accompanying note 58.
118. Bittker, supra note 1, at 267 (quoting Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 24
(1845)).
119. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 721 (1838).
120. The Court, wrote Jacobus tenBroek, "has insisted, with almost umnterrupted regularity,
that the end and object of constitutional construction is the discovery of the intention of those
persons who formulated the instrument." tenBroek, Use by the United States Supreme Court
of Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction: The Intent Theory of Constitutional Con-
struction, 27 CAxs. L. Ray. 399, 399 (1939).
121. Bittker, supra note i, at 267 n.i14 (quoting Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HAv.
L. Ray. 863, 870 (1930)).
122. Bittker, supra note 1, at 249. Bittker comments that "It]he same may be true of
judges[,]" and quotes a dissenting judge: "'It has been said, with more than a grain of truth,
that judges in tax cases these days tend to consult the statute only when the legislative history
is ambiguous."' Id. at 250 n.53 (quoting Focht v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 223, 244 (1977)
(Hall, J., dissenting)).
123. United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940).
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either temporarily or permanently lost?" asks Bittker.'2 This recalls Lewis
Carroll's Cheshire Cat that "vanished quite slowly . ending with the
grin, which remained some time after the rest of it had gone."'' 5 A
nonexistent thing cannot be "sacrosanct," that is, "[s]ecure[] . from
violation or encroachment[.' ' 26 Bittker also asks, did "Delaware's ratifiers
implicitly agree[] to accept as their own, retroactively, whatever intent might
be manifested at [later] conventions[?]" 27 Such questions demonstrate acute-
ness worthy of a schoolman. The issue, however, is not whether "the intent
of the last ratifiers to act always trumps the intent of those who acted
earlier"'' for there is no record of a prior Delaware intent. The issue,
rather, is whether, in the absence of such records, it is reasonable to assume
that those who spoke later represent a consensus.
That more clearly emerges from Bittker's other question. By article VII,
nine states suffice to establish the Constitution. Should we not, Bittker asks,
treat subsequent ratification by the four "laggard states," including New
York and Virginia, without whom, he says, "the United States ... would
have been unthinkable[,]" as incapable of altering "the 'intent' manifested
at the conventions of the first nine states to act?"' 29 No "intent" of one
state can "alter" the intent of another. On some issues there were voices
in the first nine states that anticipated New York and Virginia. Oliver
Ellsworth, a framer, spoke in the Connecticut Convention in favor of
judicial review, as did Samuel Adams in Massachusetts and Thomas McKean
in Pennsylvama. 130 The fact that such sentiments were re-echoed in New
York and Virginia bespeaks consensus, not "alteration" of prior expressions
of intent. A similar consensus existed with regard to preservation of state
autonomy with respect to internal affairs. The remarks of Pendleton and
Corbin in Virginia, and of Hamilton in New York, had been anticipated
by Wilson in Pennsylvania, Bowdoin in Massachusetts and Ellsworth in
Connecticut.13 Their remarks reflected a widely shared opinion, for as Chief
124. Bittker, supra note 1, at 268.
125. L. CARROLL, AUc's ADvENTugREs IN WONDERLAND, ch. 6.
126. Tim OxsoRi UNrVERSAL DIcTioNARY ON HisrolucAL PRnrcipaS 1776 (3d ed. 1955).
127 Bittker, supra note 1, at 268.
128. Id. at 269 (emphasis in original).
129. Id. at 268.
130. 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 21, at 196 (Ellsworth); id. at 131 (Adams); J. MCMAsTER &
F STONE, PE14NSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONsrTIrmON 1787-1788, at 766 (1888) (McKean).
131. J. MCMASTER & F STONE, supra note 130, at 265, 390 (Wilson); 2 J. ELLIOT, supra
note 21, at 129 (Bowdoin); id. at 195 (Ellsworth); G. WOOD, supra note 54, at 529 (Pendleton);
3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 21, at 107 (Corbin).
Hamilton's remark in the New York Convention, "That two supreme powers cannot act
together, is false," 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 21, at 355-56, is to be read with his Federalist
Number 9: the Constitution "leaves in their [the states'] possession certain exclusive and very
important portions of sovereign power." Tn FEDERALIST No. 9, supra note 7, at 52.
Such materials answer Bittker's question whether "the intent manifested by the members of
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Justice Marshall, who had been a delegate to the Virgima Convention,
declared, "No political dreamer was, ever wild enough to think of breaking
down the lines which separate the states, and of compounding the American
people into one common mass."'' 2 And he recognized the "immense mass
of legislation ... not surrendered to the general government [.],,33 It is a
mistake to demand a count of noses on such issues. 13 4 Madison frequently
referred to the Ratifying Conventions without drawing the line between the
nine and "laggard" states.
Anticipating Bittker, Story argued that only the records of five states
were available, 135 and it may not be assumed that they speak for the others.
Present-day polls of one thousand individuals often astonishingly forecast
the views of millions of Americans. Are not five of eleven states more
worthy of trust? 36 It is altogether reasonable to assume that the concurrence
of five bellwether states reflects the sentiments of the adjoining states. On
the issue of Senate participation in making treaties, for instance, New York
echoed the sentiments of Wilson m Pennsylvama.' 37 Because Virgima rati-
fied, after nine states did, does not deprive spokesmen like Madison and
Edmund Randolph, who introduced and explained the Virginia Plan in the
Convention, of weight. Their plan had heavily influenced the federal Con-
vention, and it is not to be assumed offhand that when they spoke in
Virginia they no longer reflected the prevailing opinon.
D. The Election of the Ratifiers
Turning to the "intent of the People who elected the ratifiers," Bittker
recounts that some delegates pledged "to vote for or against ratification,"
a particular deliberative assembly . was shared by delegates to other later assemblies."
Bittker, supra note 1, at 259. "At the nation's inception," Bittker writes, "there was such
widespread agreement that each state had exclusive authority over the roads within its
boundaries that Congress did not venture to build or repair even postal roads without state
consent, despite its explicit constitutional power 'To Establish Post Offices and Post Roads."'
Id. at 247 n.43 (emphasis in original) (quoting U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 7).
132. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819).
133. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824).
134. Lord Max Beloff, a perceptive student of American constitutional history, wrote, "In
an age when government's functions were very limited, and among a people who were convinced
that those closest to the matters to be dealt with best knew what ought to be done, the internal
power of the state governments . was unlikely to be impinged upon by the constitution-
makers." M. Bowi, Tm AmmCicAN FEDERAL GovmwENrr 15 (1959).
135. 1 J. STORY, supra note 102, § 407, at 311.
136. Story himself recognized that "[c]ontemporary construction is properly resorted to
in proportion to the uniformity and universality of that construction[.]" Id. The fact that the
"five" states were in general agreement on a number of important issues bespeaks such
"uniformity." Such a construction is not vitiated by the silence of other states. Certainly
Madison was uninfluenced by such silence. He referred to "the debates which have been
published" of other states, 3 J. ELuOT, supra note 21, at 619. So too did Patrick Henry, d.
at 592, and Benjamin Harrison, id. at 628.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
1991]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
some "were formally instructed by their constituents," and asks should the
people's intent "be considered in ascertaining the original intent."' 8 Like
Bittker, I consider that we cannot winnow the chaff from "[tihe raw
material before us [that] includes some of the pamphlets, newspaper reports,
speeches, and letters that bombarded the voters."' 13 9 Nor is recovery of the
people's intent from the election of the delegates less daunting. There were
hundreds, perhaps thousands, of local elections for winch there are probably
no extant records. A simpler approach is at hand: Bittker remarks that the
"ears [of some of the delegates] were in effect closed to argument during
the ensuing ratification debate[,]" and that "no matter how eloquent their
remarks at the later state convention," they "were merely agents for the
voters who chose them."' 4 On this reasoning the voice of the delegates was
but the voice of the people;' 4' their intent that of the people. Such was
patently the case in North Carolina where at the Yery outset the delegates,
invoking the will of their constituents, were with difficulty persuaded to
listen to Federalist arguments, and in the upshot rejected ratification alto-
gether. On the assumption that the delegates carried out their pledges and
instructions, we are entitled to interpret the rather narrowly divided votes
as recording the voice of the people. Those who were for ratification
prevailed, and under our majority rule doctrine, their vote reflected the
intent of the people.
E. The Federalist Papers
Against my view that explanations of the Constitution were "represen-
tations" made to sway votes, Bittker counters that they were merely "ar-
guments.' ' 42 Now the people "were sharply aligned in two parties for or
against" the Constitution, 14 and The Federalist Papers were designed to
allay fears and persuade voters.' 44 The label "argument" is not deterrmnative
if the function is to persuade. In a similar context, Justice Story asked, "If
the Constitution was ratified under the belief, sedulously propagated .
that such protection was afforded, would it not now be fraud upon the
138. Bittker, supra note 1, at 269 (emphasis added).
139. Id.
140. Id. (emphasis in ongmal). These remarks are fortified by the rule that an official is
presumed to perform his duty. Sanders v. United States, 594 F.2d 804, 813 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
141. Chief Justice Thomas Cooley wrote that "we are endeavoring to arrive at the intent
of the people through the discussions and deliberations of their representatives." T. COOLEY,
CONSTITUTIONAL. LwrrATIoNs 102 (7th ed. 1903).
142. Bittker, supra note 1, at 271.
143. C. VAN DOREN, THE GREAT REIEARsAL 179 (1948).
144. Hamilton said at the outset that they were meant to "give a satisfactory answer to all
the objections[.]" THE FEDERAIuST No. 1, supra note 7, at 6-7. The agenda of the Federalists
was "to a large degree set by the criticisms levelled against the Constitution by its opponents."
Zuckert, The Federalist at 200-What's It to Us, 7 CONST. CoMM. 97, 106 (1989).
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whole people to give a different construction to its powers?"' 145 What is
"belief sedulously propagated" but argument? Viewed as political propa-
ganda, as the noted British historiographer, Sir Herbert Butterfield, wrote,
it "does at least presume an audience-perhaps a 'public opimon'-whch
is judged to be susceptible to the kind of arguments and considerations set
before it."'' Bittker also asks for proof that The Federalist "came to the
attention of a significant number of ratifiers."' 47 That is not the test of a
representation. The publisher of a newspaper who directs an assurance to
a large class of readers may not demand proof from one suitor that it was
read by the class. Read or not by the class, he read it as a representation. 14
And it is late in the day to call for proof that "the representation induced
some previously opposed or undecided ratifiers to vote in favor of ratifi-
cation [.]-149 This is to require the testimony of men long dead. Madison,
who frequently cited to the ratifiers, asked for no such proof. The starting
point, in the words of Garry Wills, is that "a massive effort of persuasion
was incumbent" on proponents of the Constitution.'50 There was no need
to persuade those who already favored ratification.' Persuasion was di-
rected precisely at those who were "opposed or undecided"; and the fact
that ratification carried testifies that the persuasion was effective.
Bittker calls attention to Clinton Rossiter's statement that "The Federalist
worked only a small influence upon the course of events during the struggle
over ratification." Its "chief usefulness," Rossiter continues, "was as a
kind of debater's handbook in Virgima and New York. Copies of the
collected edition were rushed to Richmond at Hamilton's direction and used
gratefully by advocates of the Constitution in the climactic debate over
ratification.' 5 2 So both Hamilton and the Virgima advocates did not think
that it exercised "only a small influence." It is questionable whether the
145. 2 J. STORY, supra note 102, § 1084, at 29 (emphasis added).
146. H. Btrrrais-m, GEoRoE III AND TiE HISTORIANS 226 (1969).
147. Bittker, supra note 1, at 271.
148. See also infra text accompanying notes 152, 156-57.
149. Bittker, supra note I, at 271; see supra text accompanying note 146 (Butterfield).
150. G. WILLS, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON, AND
JoI w JAY viii (1982).
151. "The essays were not found in the newspapers of any state where there was unammous
or near unammous approval of the Constitution " Crane, Publius in the Provinces:
Where Was The Federalist Reprinted Outside New York City?, 21 Wm. & MARY Q. 589, 591
(1964).
152. Bittker, supra note 1, at 271-72 (quoting Tan FEDERALIST PAPERS at xi (C. Rossiter
ed. 1961)). Bittker notes a recent view that the impact of The Federalist 'on New York's
reception of the Constitution was negligible."' Bittker, supra note 1, at 272 (quoting Kaminski,
New York: The Reluctant Pillar, in Tan RELucTANT PIL.: NEW YORK AND T ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONsTrruTToN 71-72 (S. Schechter ed. 1985)). Hamilton repeated many of the
arguments in the New York Convention, and a "decisive factor" was Hamilton's "amazing




case for limited influence of The Federalist has been nailed down. Certainly
Rossiter's "research assistant," Elaine Crane, did not so conclude: "there
is no way of determining just how effective Publius was as a weapon of
the forces favoring ratification."' 53 Her short piece represents the most
detailed attempt to measure "the extent of Publius's audience[.]' ' 54 She
found that "sixteen newspapers-four each in Massachusetts, New York,
and Virginia, two in Pennsylvania, and one each in New Hampshire and
Rhode Island-" reprinted some of The Federalist, running from an extract,
through one number, to eighteen.155 As Edward Meade Earle observed,
"These articles speedily attracted attention far beyond the borders of the
State of New York, for they obviously were the work of a master politi-
cian.' ' 6 Elaine Crane remarks, "It is also important to note that New
York newspapers [which printed all but eight of the 85 numbers] did circulate
throughout the states, and it is not unlikely that Federalist leaders, whether
in Boston or Richmond, took their cues from Publius as he made his way
up and down the eastern seaboard.' ' 57
In fact, there was a concerted effort to spread Federalist materials. Tench
Coxe of Pennsylvania "coordinated the efforts at ratification, establishing
a network of communications with federalists everywhere.' 58 Thus, Wil-
son's "widely circulated defense of the Constitution" in Pennsylvania,
'became, in effect, the "official" Federalist interpretation of the Consti-
tution[.] ' ' '" 59 "[Ulsually," wrote Herbert Storing, the Federalists "conceded
the historical and legal priority of the states[,]" observing that "it is striking
how widely the Federalists adopted the view of the Union as a coming
together of sovereign states."' 1'6 Are we to attribute such unanimity (earlier
I instanced similar unanimity with respect to foreign relations and judicial
review) to spontaneous generation, not the result of a well-orchestrated
153. Crane, supra note 151, at 589.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 590.
156. Earle, supra note 152, at x. Archibald Stuart wrote to Madison, "Publius is in general
estimation, his greatness is acknowledged umversally[.]" 5 WRrriNGs OF JAMES MADISON, supra
note 98, at 54 n.2, 89 n.2.
157 Crane, supra note 151, at 591.
158. G. WI s, supra note 150, at viii.
159. Bittker, supra note 1, at 262 n.91 (quoting 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HiSTORY OF THE
RATIICAnoN OF TnE CONsTITUTION 26 (M. Jensen ed. 1976)). In the Virginia Ratification
Convention, Patrick Henry referred to the ratification proceedings in Pennsylvania and
Massachusetts. 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 21, at 592. Benjamin Harrison stated that in Massa-
chusetts the delegates were "by the address and artifice of the federalists, prevailed upon to
ratify [the Constitution]." Id. at 628.
160. Storing, The "Other" Federalist Papers: A Preliminary Sketch, 6 POL. Sci. REvIwER
215, 220, 222 (1976). When Roger Sherman returned to Connecticut to campaign for adoption
of the Constitution, he wrote, "The Powers vested in the federal government are clearly
defined, so that each state still retain its sovereignty in what concerns its own internal
government," a statement Storing considers a "rather typical description [by Federalists] of
the Constitution." Id. at 222.
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campaign? If so, such expressions represent the authentic voice of the people
so that we need look no further.
Then there is the problem of chronology-the last of The Federalist
Papers was issued shortly after ratification by South Carolina, the eighth
state to act. Can the assurances of Number 83 which came afterward,
Bittker asks, "be properly imputed to the early birds."' 61 They cannot.
Consider, however, that Number 83 was published as one of a group,
starting with Number 78, devoted to judicial review Given that there is no
express authorization for judicial overturn of legislation-such worthies as
Judge Learned Hand and Archibald Cox doubt the legitimacy of judicial
review'6-sweep away Number 78 and out goes what is considered the
prime defense of judicial review. That should hardly commend itself to
activists, who seek to expand rather than abolish judicial review.
Whether or not The Federalist Papers may be regarded as representations
to all the ratifiers, they remain important because they constitute a valuable
explanation of the thinking in Philadelphia. Jefferson regarded The Feder-
alist as "evidence of the general opinion of those who framed" the Con-
stitution. 63 Certainly Hamilton's articles did not reflect his own opimons,
for in the closing days of the Convention, he commended adoption not-
withstanding that his own views were "remote from the plan" of the
Convention.'" Edward Corwin concluded that "[it cannot be reasonably
doubted that Hamilton was here [on the issue of judicial review], as at
other points, endeavoring to reproduce the matured conclusions of the
Convention itself.' ' 65 That view is shared by Garry Wills.'6 The Federalist
was the "classic contemporary exposition" of the Constitution, 67 following
on the very heels of the Convention. Contemporaries of the Constitution,
Justice William Johnson observed, "had the best opportunities of informing
themselves of the understanding of the framers."'n Who knew that under-
standing better than Madison, the chief architect of the Constitution, who
had taken copious notes of the debates?
Not for nothing did Clinton Rossiter regard The Federalist among the
three "'sacred writings of American political history."' 69 When Hamilton
sent a copy to Washington, he replied:
161. Bittker, supra note 1, at 273.
162. R. BERMER, supra note 13, at 5-6 (Hand); A. Cox, THE RoLE or T SusR'i: CoURT
nr AmmucAN GovmuaoN 16 (1976).
163. C. RossrrER, ALEXANDER HAM TON AND Tn CoNsTTrrnoN 52 (1964).
164. 2 M. FAwRAND, supra note 7, at 645.
165. E. CoRwn, supra note 61, at 44.
166. G. Wlias, supra note 150.
167. Earle, supra note 152, at x.
168. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 290 (1827). In the fifteenth century,
Chief Justice Frowycke stated that if the legislators "have not gyven ame declaracion of theire
myndes, then [those] muste persuade us that were mooste neerest the statute." A
DiscotRsE, supra note 40, at 152.




I have read every performance which has been printed on one side and
the other of the great question lately agitated I have seen no other
so well calculated (in my judgment) to produce conviction on an unbiased
Mind . That Work will merit the Notice of Posterity[.] 170
Chief Justice Marshall wrote that The Federalist was written "to detect the
numerous misrepresentations of the Constitution; to refute the arguments
of its opponents . . [The FEDERALIST will be read and adnured when
the controversy in which that valuable treatise on government originated,
shall no longer be remembered."' 71 Marshall, be it remembered, was a
delegate to the Virginia Ratification Convention, and Washington was the
presiding officer of the federal Convention. Neither would have lent his
name to an unreliable explanation of the Constitution, one that did not
represent the understanding of the framers and ratifiers.
"Iconoclasm" holds no terrors for me, nor would I reproach one who
refused to be "overawed" by the "sacredness" of The Federalist. 7 2 Whether
The Federalist made "representations" to all of the ratifiers may be debat-
able, but a work which commanded the uncurbed admiration of Marshall
and Washington patently exercised a potent influence on the nunds of men
from the very beginning. 7 1
F. "Were the 'Framers' Individuals or States?"
Confusion is engendered by Bittker's subsidiary question: "Was, then,
the Constitution framed by the ratifying states rather than by their norm-
nees?" 17 4 The ratifying states did not "frame" the Constitution; they adopted
the draft submitted by the framers as explained to them. True it is that
"the states deternuned the number and method of selecting the ratifiers."17s
A state, however, is a conceptual construct that speaks only by its "nom-
inees." It was the "individuals" selected by the states who ratified the
Constitution on their behalf. Indeed, Bittker recognizes that the "states
acted" through the "individuals.' 1 6 The delegates alone could express their
concerns about the scope of the constitutional text they were being asked
to approve on behalf of the states. To rule out the "individuals" is to leave
the states voiceless.
Bittker suggests-with tongue in cheek, I trust-that "if there were one
hundred delegates at State A's ratification convention but only eleven at
170. Letter from George Washington to Alexander Hamilton (Aug. 28, 1788), reprinted in
30 WasriNos oF GEORGE WAs IToN 65, 66 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1939).
171. 5 J. MARsHALL, Lwm oF WASHINGToN 131-32 (1807).
172. Bittker, supra note I, at 270.
173. See supra text accompanying note 156.
174. Bittker, supra note 1, at 273 (emphasis added).
175. Id. at 273 (emphasis in original).
176. Id. at 274.
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State B's" we should "accord no more weight to the intent of all A's
delegates than to the intent of State B's eleven delegates[,]" and adds
"should we count corporate, not individual, noses?" 1 7 In the Federal
Convention, the votes were taken by the states, without regard to the
number of delegates that represented a state. Why should a different measure
be used for the intent of its "nomnnees"? It would be strange to measure
the influence of a state by the number of delegates it sent to the Convention.
There, a proposal had to persuade by its good sense, not by how many
fellow delegates accompanied the speaker. If we are to look for the "intent"
of a state, ineluctably we must seek for it in the voices of the "individuals"
it delegated to act on its behalf, unless the state vote settles the issue.
III. THE ROLE OF STARE DECIsIs
What should be the criteria for overruling prior unconstitutional decisions,
Bittker asks.' 78 In considering this question we should separate legal from
pragmatic considerations. On the legal issue, Francis Lieber, the high priest
of hermeneutics, wrote, "that which is wrong in the beginning cannot
become right in the course of time."' 79 "Strange," wrote Sir Frederick
Pollock to Justice Holmes, "that a proved series of blunders should be
more sacred than one."' 80 Usurpation is not legitimated by repetition. Faced
in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins with overruling Swift v. Tyson, around
which a century of expectations had gathered, Justice Brandeis did not
pause to break the issue into Bittker's components. Instead, he quoted
Justice Holmes, who had branded Swift as 'an unconstitutional assumption
of powers by courts of the United States which no lapse of time or
respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct."'"" Bittker
likewise does not favor "systematically perpetuating earlier decisions that
... were devoid of constitutional legitimacy."'8 2
Convinced (by my study fourteen years ago of the history of the fourteenth
amendment)' that Brown v. Board of Education,'1 which condemned
segregated schools, was without constitutional warrant, I yet concluded, "It
would ... be utterly unrealistic and probably impossible to undo the past
177. Id.
178. Id. at 278-80.
179. F. LiEBER, LEGAL AND PoLrricAL HERENcs 209-10 (3d ed. 1880).
180. 1 Ho.s-PoLLocK LETTERS 239 (M. Howe ed. 1946). Lord Justice Dennman stated,
"the mere statement and re-statement of a doctrine cannot make it law, unless it can be
traced to some competent authority." O'Connell v. Regina, 8 Eng. Rep. 1061, 1143 (1844).
181. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Black & White Taxicab
Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928)).
182. Bittker, supra note 1, at 276.
183. R. BERoE, GovERNmENT BY JuDiCiARY: THE TRANsFoRmAmoN OF THE FOURTEENTH
AmNDnmNr (1977).
184. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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in the face of the expectations that the segregation decisions, for example,
have aroused in our black citizenry ... But to accept thus far accomplished
ends is not to condone the continued employment of the unlawful means."' 85
A few years later I wrote, "But while decisions can be overruled, past
events are not so easily undone. Like poured concrete, they have hardened,
so that overruling decisions cannot restore the status quo ante.' ' is6 The past,
Chief Justice Marshall wrote, "cannot be recalled by the most absolute
power.'1 7 But, I continued, "The practical difficulty of a rollback cannot
excuse the continuation, the ever-expanding resort to such unconstitutional
practices. 'Go and sm no more' does not signify the acceptance of illegiti-
mate acts, but counsels, rather, do not continue to apply unconstitutional
doctrine in ever-expanding fasuon."' 88 Concretely, Bittker and I agree that
'blacks cannot be forced back into a ghetto,"' but I would halt 'court-
administered schools and prisons, affirmative action, busing, and the like."' 19
The passage of years has not shaken my confidence that these views represent
sound sense.
Bittker rightly points out that there is "no evidence that the framers
intended this result[,]" i.e., an "entirely discretionary doctrine in deciding
whether to preserve or overrule erroneous constitutional decisions [.]"9 On
ruthlessly logical grounds one may conclude "all or nothing." Nevertheless,
I am prepared to let Brown stand under Henry Monaghan's test: overturn
would trigger "massive destabilization . [that] would threaten the func-
tioning of the federal government."' 9' Does repudiation of the Legal Tender
185. R. BERGER, supra note 183, at 412-13.
186. R. BEROER, FEDERALISM, supra note 2, at 179-80.
187 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810). "The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration." Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank,
308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940).
188. R. BER ER, FEDERALISM, supra note 2, at 180 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
Justice Edward White, joined by three other dissenters, said in Adams Express Co. v. Ohio
State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194, 250 (1897), where a state action was pushed "to the confines of
the constitution," that "if, under the rule of stare decisis, the cases should be followed,
they should not be extended."
189. Bittker, supra note 1, at 277 (quoting R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME
COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE 83 n.29 (1982)).
190. Bittker, supra note 1, at 277-78 (emphasis in original).
191. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLuM. L. REv. 723,
750 (1988) (footnote omitted).
Testifying in the hearings on his nomination to the Supreme Court, Judge Robert Bork said
that "[r]espect for precedent is a part of the great tradition of our law, just as is fidelity to
the intent of those who ratified the Constitution and enacted our statutes." See Bittker, supra
note 1, at 276 n.142. I beg to differ. When a judge acts despite the clear intent of the framers
he is revising the Constitution, a process of amendment reserved to the people. Such precedents
are entitled to no respect. See supra text accompanying notes 179-80.
In 1970, Chief Justice Burger "categorically" rejected the "thesis that what the Court said
lately controls over the Constitution." Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 22 (1970) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting). Justice Douglas wrote, a judge "remembers above all else that it is the
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Casesln pose similar hazards? At issue was the constitutional authority for
issuance of paper money The youthful Holmes encapsulated the difficulty-
the power to coin money implies metallic coin and does not extend to paper
money. He "could not see 'how a limited power which is expressly given
... can be enlarged as an incident to some other express power." 1 93
Possibly an overruling decision might be so cushioned as to sustain the
further use of paper money until an amendment to authorize its use can be
prepared and adopted. 194 Whether or not overturn of the Legal Tender
Cases may in terms of consequences be analogized to Brown is a matter of
judgment on which I have no opinion.
The inclusion of corporations m the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment affords a similar example; it took place in 1886.195 The language
of the clause is identical with that of the fifth amendment. Bittker con-
vincingly demonstrates that the fifth's "person" was applicable only to
man.'9 Willard Hurst, the foremost historian of the "American law's
adjustment to the business corporation" observed that the fourteenth's
protection of "person" was "extended by fresh lawmaking." And he
rejected the 'conspiracy theory' of the fourteenth amendment . . which
asserted that wily lawyers smuggled corporations into the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause[.]" 1 My own study of the history of the amend-
ment uncovered no hint that the framers were concerned with anything
other than actual persons. In our time Justice Black, taking no account of
possible "massive destabilization," called on the Court to read corporations
out of the fourteenth amendment on the ground that "the people were not
told" that they were "granting new and revolutionary rights to corpora-
tions."' 98 Whatever consequences might follow should be weighed against
Constitution which he swore to support and defend, not the gloss which his predecessors may
have put upon it." Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 CoLum. L. Ra,. 735, 736 (1949). And Justice
Frankfurter stated that "the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself
and not what we have said about it." Graves v. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
192. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).
193. See 6 C. FAnuAN, HisToRY op THE SuPRmE COURT OF THE UNmrD STATES 715 (1971)
(quoting 4 AM. L. REv. 768 (letter by Holmes, J., to the editor)).
In the campaign for adoption of the Constitution, Judge Edmund Pendleton stated in the
Virginma Ratification Convention, "Paper money and tender laws may be passed in
opposition to the federal principle, and restrictions of tis Constitution." 3 J. ELLiOT, supra
note 21, at 549.
194. For example, Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 628-29 (1965), held that decisional
retroactivity was not a categorical imperative. See Berger, Retroactive Administrative Decisions,
115 U. PA. L. Ray. 371 (1967).
195. Bittker, supra note 1, at 254 n.65.
196. Id. at 253.
197. Id. at 254, 255 n.66.




the integrity of the Constitution and the unconstitutional revision of the
instrument by the judiciary
But I do not share Monaghan's view that reapportionment is 'far too
deeply embedded in the constitutional order to admit of reassessment." ' "9
The reapportionment doctrine was born in Baker v. Carn2 in 1962; it is
only twenty-nne years old. Yet, Philip Kurland observed, "The list of
opinions destroyed by the Warren Court reads like a table of contents from
an old constitutional casebook." 20 1 Why is a twenty-nine year-old "prece-
dent" more sacrosanct than decisions that were 100 years old or older, and
therefore nearer to the thinking of the drafters of the instrument? It is not
as if reapportionment was the inescapable answer, as the split of the Court
in Baker v. Carr attests. Ward Elliott persuasively demonstrated on practical
grounds that the reapportionment decisions were not really necessary.2
Hamilton presciently cautioned that "every breach of the fundamental
laws, though dictated by necessity... forms a precedent for other breaches
where the same plea of necessity does not exist at all."' 3 Let me muster a
few such cases.
A. The Six-Person Jury Case
A twelve-person jury is deeply rooted in Anglo-American history; seven
early state constitutions expressly provided for a jury of twelve.2 It was
unceremoniously discarded by Williams v Florda2 s as "unrelated to the
great purposes which gave rise to the jury in the first place." ' Speaking
by Justice Holmes, the Court said, "If a thing has been practised for two
hundred years by common consent, it will take a strong case for the
199. Bittker, supra note 1, at 277 n.146 (quoting Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions
Seriously, 39 MD. L. Rnv 1, 7 (1979)).
200. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Archibald Cox instances the reapportionment cases as a "dramatic"
example of "reading into the generalities of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
notions of wise and fundamental policy which are not even faintly suggested in the words of
the Constitution, and which lack substantial support in other conventional sources of law."
A. Cox, supra note 162, at 100.
201. P KuRLAND, PouMCs, THE CONSTrUTION AND TM WARREN COURT 90-91 (1970).
202. W EL~IoTT, supra note 29. Philip Kurland wrote that "reapportionment of the state
and local legislatures was not among the more pressing problems in post-World War II
America." P KuAND, supra note 201, at 83.
203. Tn FEDERALiST No. 25, supra note 7, at 158. Compare Judge Frank Easterbrook's
queries: "Will the Republic fall apart if some states use capital pumshment and others do
not? If some states permit abortion and others prohibit the practice?" Easterbrook, Approaches
to Judicial Review, in THE BLEssINGs OF LmERTY 145, 156 (1989).
204. R. BERoER, supra note 65, at 269 n.63.
205. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
206. Id. at 89-90 (footnote omitted).
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Fourteenth Amendment to affect it."' 2 Return to the twelve-man jury
would not cause a "massive dislocation."
B. Migrant Indigents' Right to Support
Resting on the "right to travel," Shapiro v. Thompson 20s struck down a
state requirement of one year of residence before an indigent migrant could
be eligible for "welfare" aid. Zechariah Chafee wrote, "there is a queer
uncertainty about what clause in the Constitution establishes this right" to
travel.2" Justice Harlan stamped it as a "nebulous judicial construct"; 210
and the Shapiro majority itself observed that the "right finds no explicit
mention in the Constitution," but found "no occasion to ascribe the source
of this right to travel interstate to a particular constitutional provision,"
content that it "has been firmly established" 21 -by the Court. Be it assumed
that a "right to travel" exists, it is a manifest non-sequitur to insist that it
entitles a migrant to munmediate support at the terminus. For six hundred
years local communities limited poor relief to their own residents; the
practice, reaching back to pre-Elizabethan times, was picked up by colomal
enactments and, at the time of Shapiro, expressed in the statutes of forty
or more states. 212 Denial of support to migrants at the terminus would not
cause a "massive destabilization."
C. The Death Penalty Cases
For centuries the power to pronounce on life or death in capital cases
was committed to the untrammeled discretion of the jury.213 Nothing in the
"cruel and unusual punishment" clause touched this discretion. Intrusion
into the domain of capital punishment has been rested on the "cruel and
unusual" clause, but the fifth amendment contemplated deprivation of life
after a due process trial. Only in 1972 did Furman v. Georga,2 4 decided
by a divided Court, upset the centuries-old practice; but the backlash led
the Court to confine itself to cases of rape215 and accomplices to murder. 21 6
The number of convictions for murder that would be sustained, were these
cases reversed, would not cause a "massive destabilization."
207. Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922).
208. 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Harlan dissented.).
209. Z. CHAE, THEE HuMAN Rioms iN THE CONsTrrumoN 188 (1956).
210. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 216 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part).
211. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 630 (footnote omitted).
212. Berger, Residence Requirements for Welfare and Voting, 42 OIo ST. L.J. 853, 853,
854 n.8 (1981).
213. R., BERGER, supra note 189, at 130-39.
214. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
215. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
216. Emnund v. Flonda, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
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D. The Commerce Clause
Invasion of state control of internal matters under the cloak of interstate
commerce is a tale of steadily increasing federal encroachment. The com-
merce clause refers to "commerce with foreign nations and among the
several States." Elsewhere I have shown that by "among" the founders
understood "between" the States. 217 Hamilton's reference to "commerce
with other nations and between the States" is illustrative. 218 One of the
most glaring intrusions into the state domain took place in 1942 in Wickard
v. Filburn.219 A federal act applied federal regulation "to production [of
wheat] not intended in any part for commerce but wholly for consumption
on the farm, "22 apparently because such consumption constituted about
20% of production nationwide. Bearing in mnd that the founders were
assured that the delegated powers would not extend to agriculture,221 it is
altogether improbable that they meant to grant power to regulate a farmer's
production for his own consumption, even though that wheat, in conjunction
with that of farmers in other states, might "overhang the market." A key
consideration in examnimng the commerce power is the stubborn deterim-
nation of the states to retain control of their internal affairs. Bittker notes
Chief Justice Marshall's reference to .'"[the acknowledged power of a State
to regulate its police.' This power encompassed the 'immense mass of
legislation . not surrendered to the general government[1.]' '
The narrow compass of the interstate power is underscored by Justice
Story's statement that "commerce" does not
comprehend any commerce, which is purely internal, between man and
man in a single State, or between different parts of the same State, and
not extending to, or affecting other States It is not an apt phrase
to indicate the mere interior traffic of a single State. The completely
217 R. BEROER, FEDERALISM, supra note 2, at 126-27. James Wilson used 'among'
interchangeably with 'between' and to mean 'between."' Brown, Book Review, 67 HAv L.
REv. 1439, 1450 (1954).
218. Tan FEDERALsT No. 23, supra note 7, at 142.
219. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
220. Id. at 118 (emphasis added).
221. Hamilton wrote in THE FEDERAuLST No. 17, supra note 7, at 102, "the supervision of
agriculture which [is] proper to be provided for by local legislation, can never be [a]
desirable careal of a general jurisdiction."
222. Bittker, supra note 1, at 245 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 203,
208 (1824)). Hamilton told the New York Convention that "were the laws of the Union to
new-model the internal police in any State," that would be objectionable. 2 J. ELLIOT, supra
note 21, at 267-68. Judge Pendleton assured the Virginia Convention that the Constitution




internal commerce of a State may be properly considered as reserved to
the State itself.2
Even more egregious is the recent Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority,22 which decided by a five to four vote that mumcipal
mass transit is governed by federal minimum wages and hours standards.
By the logic of Garcia, one who rides by subway in New York City from
72nd to 42nd Street travels in interstate commerce! State control of the
janitors of its schools and hospitals is incontrovertibly local, as is trans-
portation of people solely within town confines. Neither of these can be
considered to be in the stream of commerce3m Reversal of Wickard and
Garcia should not generate shock waves of "massive destabilizatlon. 1
'
2s
The above cases, I may add, by no means exhaust the list.
It has been suggested that upholding the "small" decisions that flout the
framers' intent would maintain "public faith in the judiciary "227 The choice
is not between threatemng the "public faith" and "continued adherence to
a rule unjustified in reason." It is not "reason" that is at stake, but whether
judicial revision of the Constitution may be concealed from the people.28
"Faith" in the Court that, rests on such concealment is a precarious and
unworthy base for continued exercise of usurped power. Lest I be charged
223. 2 J. STORy, supra note 102, § 1065, at 8. In discussing the early hesitance of the Court
to intrude into the domain of land transportation, see supra note 2, Bittker referred to the
distinction drawn by the Court respecting transportation on the "navigable waters." Bittker,
supra note i, at 247-49. Earlier I wrote, "What Founder conceived that transportation from
Boston to Plymouth, Massachusetts by wagon train was in intra-state commerce, whereas it
became inter-state commerce if transportation was by coastwise vessel?" R. BERGER, FEDEE-
ALMsm, supra note 2, at 135 (footnote omitted). I was therefore heartened to find Story's
statement that the commerce power extends "to the regulation of navigation, and to the
coasting trade and fisheries, within, as well as without any State, wherever it is connected
with the commerce or intercourse with any other State, or with foreign nations." 2 J. STORY,
supra note 102, § 1075, at 20 (emphasis added).
224. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
225. Bittker notes that 'the all but exclusive domestic concern of the Founders was exactions
by States from their neighbors."' Bittker, supra note 1, at 241 (quoting R. BERGER, FEDERALISM,
supra note 2, at 128). Judge Henry Friendly wrote, "Under principles coming down from
Heydon's Case [76 Eng. Rep. 637 (1584)], a court faced with the task of construction must
endeavor to appreciate the mischief the framers were seeking to alleviate." Friendly, supra
note 50, at 943. At the outset of the Convention, Edmund Randolph observed that "the
general object was to provide a cure for the evils under which the U.S. laboured." 1 M.
FARRAND, supra note 7, at 51.
226. Dissenting in Garcia, then Justice Rehnquist was "confident" that the minority view
will "in time again command the support of a majority of this Court." Garcia, 469 U.S. at
580.
227. Bittker, supra note 1, at 279. Those "small" decisions recall Hamilton's comment in
TBE FEDERALisT No. 25, supra note 7, at 158: "every breach of the fundamental laws, though
dictated by necessity forms a precedent for other breaches where the same plea of necessity
does not exist at all."
228. See supra note 82. Solicitor General Robert Jackson wrote, "This political role of the
Court has been obscure to laymen-even to most lawyers." R. JAcKsoN, THE STRuoia FoR
JuDIcuL SuRamAcy xi (1941).
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with sterile historicism, let me avouch Washington's Farewell Address. As
presiding officer of the convention, he knew at first hand the values the
framers sought to conserve:
If in the opimon of'the People, the distribution or modification of the
Constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by
an amendment in the way winch the Constitution designates. But let
there be no change by usurpation; for though this, in one instance, may
be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by winch free
governments are destroyed. The precedent must always greatly over-
balance in permanent evil any partial or transient benefit winch the use
can at any time yield.-
CONCLUSION
Bittker has made us think about aspects of originalism which hitherto
have escaped attention. For that our thanks. If this Article has not dealt
satisfactorily with his questions, the task may be undertaken by younger
scholars. For it is the essence of a good question that it will not down.
Onginalism is not a product of the unthinking; original intent has been
applied over the centuries by a long line of judges. It represents a distillation
of experience that is not lightly to be dismissed. Not for nothing did Cief
Justice Marshall regard it as the "most sacred rule of interpretation."230
What is the alternative? Effective criticism must suggest one. Justice
Scalia remarked that "surely there must be general agreement not only that
judges reject one exegetical approach (onginalism), but that they adopt
another."'23 Nonoriginalists, however, cannot unite on a single alternative
but struggle in a welter of theories. A leading activist, Michael Perry, urged
his fellows "to get on with the business of -elaborating a defensible nono-
ngmalist conception of constitutional text/interpretation and judicial role."11 2
Another activist theorist, Paul Brest, considers that "no defensible criteria
exist" whereby to assess "value-oriented constitutional adjudication."2 3
"lilt is hard," remarks Justice Scalia, "to discern any emerging consensus
among the nonoriginalists as to what this [substitute] might be. ' 12 4 In the
upshot, nonoriginalism delivers judgment to the untrammeled discretion of
the judge, the "main danger" being that "the judges will mistake their own
predilections for the law "231
229. Farewell Address, 35 Wrr n Gs oF GEORGE WAsHNGToN, supra note 170, at 229.
230. JoHN MARsHALL's DEFENSE OF McCulloch v. Maryland, supra note 32, at 167.
231. Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CN. L. REv 849, 855 (1989).
232. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional
"Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 551, 602 (1985).
233. Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative
Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1065 (1981).




It is a great merit of onginalism, as Thomas Grey wrote, that it is a
"simple" concept. "It establishes," wrote Justice Scalia, "a historical
critenon that is conceptually quite separate from the preferences of the
judge himself."' 36 Therefore, it can help to curb judicial revision of the
Constitution. It was the sober Justice Harlan who admonished:
When the Court disregards the express intent and understanding of the
Framers, it -has invaded the realm of the political process to which the
amending power was committed, and it has violated the constitutional
structure which it is its highest duty to protect. 7
236. Id. at 864. Tis was well understood by the founders. During the debate on ratification
of the Constitution, the Federal Farmer referred to
the spirit .and true meamng of the constitution, as collected from what must
appear to have been the intentions of the people when they made it. I will
not suppose it intended to lodge an arbitrary power or discretion in judges, to
decide as their conscience, their opimons, their caprice, or their politics might
dictate.
2 THE ComPLEn Airn-F DEmRAnr 322-23 (H. Storing ed. 1981).
237. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 203 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part).
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